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Some Brief Observations on the Significance of
Deterrence in Braithwaite's 'Pre-empting Terrorism'
Mark Findlay*
The regulatory model preferred by John Braithwaite, over what he sees as 'crude' criminal
justice or war models for preventing and controlling terrorism, has its own limitations.
These limitations evidence in the model's essential reliance on, and confidence in,
deterrence. Even in Braithwaite's discussion of escalation and de-escalation, these
concepts measure deterrence strategies.
Contextual wisdom during a crisis on the difference between appeasement and over-
reaction can be difficult in advance of actually seeing how the deterrence (or its absence) is
responded to.
The prevailing reliance, whether the terrorist is responsible and rational or irrational and
incompetent, is that terrorists will make choices dependant on an extant and common
morality. Essentially what is required is a perception of justice on both sides that tends to
down play defiance over contested political realities.
The research shows a surprising capacity of people to buckle under to social control that
delivers bad outcomes, so long as those outcomes are dispensed through processes they
accept as fair.
However, the essence of the terrorist situation is a contest over legitimacies, such as justice
and fairness, and the consequent defiance in the face of imposed fundamentals.
This ascription to deterrence is located in the methodological quicksand of micro
managing 'macro-disasters'. The confidence in deterrence strains the credibility of
evidence-based regulation while tending to displace some of the vital informants of
terrorism and political over-reaction, to the detriment of understanding the central
phenomena of terrorism as much as preventing or controlling it.
Deterrence must assume both choice and at least recurrent rationality. But the ultimate
defiance of terrorism and of the communities it attracts operates within determined counter
rationalities. The impact of deterrence on the terrorist, even if it is received and recognized,
will be diminished or defused by competing normative frameworks and neutralizing
alternative realities.
Braithwaite correctly contends that the 'war on terror' in its problematic Iraq context, has
employed suspect justifications and publicly proposed the wrong enemies. In so doing the
anti-terrorist responses, predominantly military, have not addressed the central constituents
of the current insurgency. The same might be said of a heavy-handed, shoot to kill response
to the recent London bombings. Excessive responses no doubt fuel and favour terrorist
counter realities. Excessive responses galvanise supportive communities beyond defiance
on to a complementarity with the terrorist's reinterpretation of their actions, as well as what
might be promoted as deterrence. In this situation deterrence may not counter-balance
competing realities that foster and are fostered by terrorism. In fact the deterrent response
may stimulate just those behaviours which it sets out to contain.
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There needs to be adequate analysis in the model proposed of its impact over supportive
communities as well as terrorist perpetrators. Where the alternative realities common within
such communities are confirmed by deterrent responses (excessive or otherwise), the
outcomes will not be modified as intended through the control or regulation process,
particularly where they are pre-emptive.
Even if deterrence is to prevail as the central policy motivator for preempting terrorism
it is distracting to diminish the potential of an adequately constructed criminal justice
response. In Transforming International Criminal Justice1 we propose a reinterpreted
international criminal trial as a venue wherein diverse justice paradigms might be employed
in better integrating victim communities and thereby legitimating positive justice influences
towards governance and peace-making.
Directing pre-emptive strategies more towards referent communities (often victims of
the 'injustice' against which the terrorist meaning is directed) has the persuasive potential
of undermining the legitimacy on which the terrorist relies. It is such legitimacy as much as
the spectacular nature and consequences of terrorist acts which resists the deterrent
response.
A social and criminal justice response to terrorism is a more grounded pre-emption than
deterrence in the politico/military manifestation. Involving, as Braithwaite mentions, an
imbalance between primary and tertiary prevention, 'war'-style deterrence should be
superceded as well as preceded by a war for the hearts and the minds of otherwise resistant
communities. Secondary prevention (diplomacy) can, as much as criminal justice, provide
a vehicle for the new war on terror but only where it works from a commitment to universal
justice values. This is very much the case in post-conflict states where legitimacy is
marginal and vulnerable to the excesses of the institutional past.
The representation of primary and secondary prevention as largely about containment,
and enlargement referring to expansive deterrence and intrusive 'democratisation', fails to
recognize the proactive potential of the foundation stages. This is a central flaw of
pyramidic modeling, passing through and up from these foundations without appreciating
their recurrent and interactive influence over the 'final resort'.
It is necessary, for those who manage pre-emption, to go further than a 'bottom-up
commitment to peace'. That is to recognize and build the interactive capacity of justice
above deterrence, as well as a victim community focus for delegitimising terror (visualizing
victims on both sides of the terror divide).
In this regard the 'web of controls' advocated but not elaborated by Braithwaite is indeed
worthy of development. The 'mutually reinforcing redundancy of control' is confirmed as
communities reject the legitimacy of terrorist ideology and embrace competing normative
frameworks as a consequence of prevailing justice. The impact is neither as extensive or
long-lasting when control depends on deterrence coming from an imposed and opposed
rationality.
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